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A Persistent Critique: Constructing Clients’ Stories
Abstract
Drawing on narrative, post-colonial, clinical and other critical theory, this article explores the role and
necessity of critical reflection by lawyers in the construction of clients' stories in representation. In particular,
the piece is framed by the experiences of transgender clients and their student attorneys. The piece begins by
examining the "problem of representation" - the challenge of seeing and hearing clients' stories, particularly
when those stories do not fit in to our understanding of how the world works. It moves on to describe first the
"official stories" that govern how the legal system treats transgender people and second how those stories are
themselves porous, based as they are on assumptions that don't adequately address the particular issues
confronting the particular client who has come into contact with the legal system. The third part examines
how in particular cases, with critical reflection, law students and lawyers were able to see and hear, and thus
represent, their transgender clients. The piece concludes with the suggestion that the representation of
transgender clients can be used as a metaphor for all client representation: if we as lawyers notice what we
bring to the representation - both our assumptions and our expertise - we are able to hear our client's
particular story and work with her to construct a new story that both resonates for the client and can be heard
and believed by the legal decisionmaker. In this way, critical reflection is a skill that makes us better lawyers for
all our clients.
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Drawing on narrative, post-colonial, clinical and other critical
theory, this article explores the role and necessity of critical reflection
by lawyers in the construction of clients' stories in representation. In
particular, the piece is framed by the experiences of transgender cli-
ents and their student attorneys. The piece begins by examining the
"problem of representation" - the challenge of seeing and hearing
clients' stories, particularly when those stories do not fit in to our un-
derstanding of how the world works. It moves on to describe first the
"official stories" that govern how the legal system treats transgender
people and second how those stories are themselves porous, based as
they are on assumptions that don't adequately address the particular
issues confronting the particular client who has come into contact
with the legal system. The third part examines how in particular
cases, with critical reflection, law students and lawyers were able to
see and hear, and thus represent, their transgender clients. The piece
concludes with the suggestion that the representation of transgender
clients can be used as a metaphor for all client representation: if we
as lawyers notice what we bring to the representation - both our
assumptions and our expertise - we are able to hear our client's par-
ticular story and work with her to construct a new story that both
resonates for the client and can be heard and believed by the legal
decisionmaker. In this way, critical reflection is a skill that makes us
better lawyers for all our clients.
INTRODUCTION
Transgender lawyer and activist Dean Spade came to the law
school where I was teaching to give a presentation on issues faced by
transgender clients in the legal system. He described himself as a fe-
male-to-male transgender attorney and talked about his work as
founder of the Sylvia Rivera Law Project, a project that serves low-
* Practitioner in Residence, Washington College of Law, American University. I
would like to thank the numerous readers and editors who have helped shape this piece:
Jane Aiken, Nancy Cook, Nan Hunter, Minna Kotkin, Kate Kruse, Elliott Milstein, Susan
Schmeiser, Ann Shalleck, Dean Spade; and the WCL Clinical Scholarship workshop group:
Lily Camet, Janie Chuang, Dina Haynes, Margaret Johnson, Sarah Paoletti, Vicki Phillips,
Josh Sarnoff and Claire Smearman. Also thanks to my research assistants, Gina Beck,
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income transgender, intersex and gender non-conforming clients1 . In
addition to analyzing legal and political issues, he told the story of his
own arrest for using a men's room in Grand Central Station. After
the presentation, one of my students remarked to me that she had
found the presentation very interesting, but said that she just
"couldn't take Dean Spade seriously as a man." I, in fact, had been
wondering, "what ever happened to just identifying as a butch les-
bian?" But then I realized that Spade's story wasn't about being a
man or a butch lesbian: it was about being a transgender person.
2 This
realization led me to reflect on the disconnect between the story Dean
Spade told in his presentation and the stor(ies) the student and I had
heard or expected to hear, and also on the fact that both the student
and I were able to recognize our inability to hear him.
Lawyers tell stories in their role as "representors" of clients and,
in that role, they must tell stories that can be heard and believed by
legal decisionmakers. The problem, though, is that lawyers are often
themselves unable to hear their clients' stories, and are therefore una-
ble to represent the clients in a way that doesn't further silence them.
We've all heard, and many of us have written, that lawyers are story-
tellers. 3 More than that, we've all heard, and many of us have written,
that not all stories are equal in the eyes of the law. 4 Rather, some
1 See Silvia Rivera Law Project, http://www.srlp.org (last visited February 19, 2006).
2 A note about pronoun use and terminology: In this article, to the extent possible, I
use the pronoun preferred by the person about whom I am writing. In describing the
students' interaction with their clients, I try to track the students' use of the pronoun, using
whichever pronoun they are using. As for the term "transgender," I use this word to mean
anyone who is identified, or identifies, as not fitting into one of the two established gender
categories, i.e., male or female. See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/Modeling Gender,
18 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 15, n.2 (2003); Susan Stryker, The Transgender Issue: An In-
troduction, 4 GENDER L. Q. 145, 149 (1998) ("I use transgender not to refer to one particu-
lar identity or way of being embodied but rather as an umbrella term for a wide variety of
bodily effects that disrupt or denaturalize heteronormatively constructed linkages between
an individual's anatomy at birth, a nonconsensually assigned gender category, psychical
identifications with sexed body images and/or gendered subject positions and the perform-
ance of specifically gendered social, sexual or kinship functions.").
3 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM AND JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW
(2000); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories and Stories About Them, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 9
(1994); Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law Narratives: The Critical Practice and Theory
of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 861 (1992); Binny Miller,
Telling Stories About Cases and Clients: The Ethics of Narrative, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmIcs
1 (2000); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989);
Symposium, Lawyers as Storytellers & Storytellers As Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Sym-
posium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REV. 567 (1994).
4 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971 (1991);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client Nar-
rative, 100 YALE L.J. 65 (1991); Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475
(1993); Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber and Sherry, 46
VAND. L. REV. 665 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV.
607 (1994); Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on
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stories are believed and valued by legal decisionmakers, and thus be-
come a part of the network of stories embodied in the dominant legal
discourse. Others are not believed or valued by the legal deci-
sionmakers and thus remain outside that discourse. Scholars and crit-
ics have identified these as "outsider narratives" and have suggested
that the "official stories" are official only because they are constructed
as such: they are told by and about people familiar and similar to the
"insiders" who hear the stories, and thus are easily incorporated into
the dominant legal discourse. 5 Stories told by or about those unfamil-
iar to the insiders hearing the stories don't fit easily into the insiders'
world view, and thus don't become official stories. The system of offi-
cial stories thus reinforces both the dominant discourse and the si-
lence of those outside that discourse.
The challenge, therefore, for those of us who teach any kind of
lawyering, is to embrace and then impart to our students the ideas that
all stories - the official ones, the background ones, the outsider ones,
the insider ones - are constructed. Moreover, and perhaps more im-
portant, lawyers play a huge - if not the biggest - role in the con-
struction of these stories, and with this role comes enormous power
and responsibility. Lawyers can either use this power and responsibil-
ity to construct stories based on what has come before, ratifying the
official stories,6 or they can critically reflect on the system of official
and unofficial stories, working to identify what makes some stories
Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Gilkerson, supra note 3,; Carolyn Grose, A
Field Trip to Benetton and Beyond, 4 CLIN. L. REV. 109 (1997) (and sources cited therein);
Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice of
Color: Rejecting the Imposition of Process Theory in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWA L. REV.
803 (1994); Lucie E. White, Goldberg v. Kelly on the Paradox of Lawyering for the Poor, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 861 (1990).
5 1 use the terms "outsider narrative" and "outsider jurisprudence" generally to de-
scribe a movement in legal literature and academia to incorporate the voices of "outsiders"
into mainstream legal dialogue. Professor Mari Matsuda, University of Hawaii, When the
First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, Keynote Address at
the Yale Law School Conference on Women of Color and the Law (Apr. 16, 1988), in 11
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989). By "outsider," I mean someone who does not have access
to the channels of power and communication in this society; conversely, an "insider" is
someone who does have that access. The "outsider jurisprudence" or "outsider narrative"
movement embraces many different theories and theorists, which are beyond the scope of
this article. For more analysis and exploration, see, e.g., Arthur Austin, A Primer on
Deconstruction's "Rhapsody of Word-Plays," 71 N.C. L. Rev. 201, 230-31 (1992) (Critical
Legal Studies' argument that political and class interests govern judicial decisionmaking).
See also DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOrOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF
RACISM 1-12 (1992); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea
for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Mes-
senger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 127, 127-28 (1987) (all three Critical Race theorists using "outsider narrative" to ex-
pose how the law and society reinforce prejudice and discrimination).
6 Gerald P. Lopez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1984).
Spring 2006]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
official and others unofficial and what goes into the construction of
these stories. Having so situated themselves in relation to this system
of stories, lawyers can work with their clients to construct new stories
that both reflect the clients' own, if constructed, reality, and can be
heard by the legal system.
And that brings me back to Dean Spade. The student could iden-
tify right away that Spade's story didn't make sense to her. Her ac-
knowledgment of that confusion allowed me to notice my own
reaction to his story and to question that reaction. 7 I realized that
representing transgender clients offers the opportunity to examine
and challenge our own assumptions about gender and sexual identity
because a transgender client's story is indeterminate, unexpected, un-
explainable in the law's language of gender and sexual identity.
I thus situated (and situate) myself as a learner, along with my
students. This location is implicit in the idea of reflective lawyering,
which is ultimately what this piece is about: the role (and necessity) of
critical reflection in representation. By critical reflection, I mean the
process by which we self-consciously locate ourselves within the sys-
tem in which we are operating and in relation to the other players in
that system. Through this process, we are able to identify what as-
sumptions are at work and the effect they are having on us, on the
other players, and on the system itself. Having identified those as-
sumptions and how they are operating, we find ourselves with more
room to make intentional choices about how to proceed with the rep-
resentation of our client, and we end up being more effective advo-
cates for them, both because we ourselves make space to hear our
clients' stories, and because we create that space in the legal arena so
that the clients' stories can be heard (and maybe even believed) there.
As such, critical reflection is a skill that makes us better lawyers.
In law school clinics, we teach the theory and skill of critical re-
flection in part by giving students experiences with clients. We hope
that such experiences will open up awareness and prompt discussion
about the students' assumptions. The decentering around concepts of
gender that takes place when students/lawyers work with transgender
clients serves as a metaphor for the necessary decentering that should
take place in all lawyer/client communication, in order for the lawyer
to be able to represent the client in a way that doesn't further
marginalize her. As teachers, we participate in this process by watch-
ing our students grapple with the decentering they experience and
7 1 don't know through what tens the student was viewing Dean Spade's story. Since I
do identify as a lesbian (itself an identity that some view as contesting hegemonic, official
gender stories), however, I recognized that my reaction took place, at least in part, through
the lens of my own personal experience and how I choose to represent that experience.
[Vol. 12:329
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then by reflecting on it with them, encouraging them to explore their
feelings of disorientation and to recognize what space opens once they
identify their assumptions. As learners along with them, we also push
ourselves to be self-conscious about extracting theory - lawyering
theory and teaching theory - from this practice, and by framing the
practice itself in the theory of critical reflection.
In this article I want to explore the representation of transgender
clients to see what lawyering theory we can export to representation
of other clients. In the first section, I describe the "problem of repre-
sentation" - the challenge of seeing and hearing clients' stories, par-
ticularly when those stories do not fit in to our understanding of how
the world works. In the second part of the article, I describe first the
"official stories" that govern how the legal system treats transgender
people, and how those stories are themselves porous, based as they
are on assumptions that don't adequately account for the particular
issues confronting the legal system. In describing these stories, I will
examine how they - and the assumptions on which they are based -
act to oppress transgender people. I conclude the second part with a
description of some "unofficial" stories told by transgender clients in
several law school clinics. In the third part, I describe how, with criti-
cal reflection, the students who worked with those clients were able to
see and hear, and thus represent, them. I conclude with a reflection
on what the students learned in the course of the representation of
their transgender clients, and what those lessons teach us about the
theory of reflective lawyering in representation.
I. THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION
Lawyers are retained to provide representation to clients in legal
proceedings." This kind of representation entails the lawyer standing
in for the client in specific and ritualized contexts and pleading the
client's case by taking the client's particular factual situation and "re-
presenting" it in the language of law. The lawyer's job is to assemble
diffuse facts into a medium that renders it recognizable by the law. In
order to perform this task effectively, the lawyer - the representor -
must first know her subject - the representee. That knowing takes
the form initially of seeing and hearing the client, processes that ide-
ally would lead to an understanding of her story. The next step of the
act of representation is the one most often thought of as "represent-
ing," and that is the actual portrayal of the client, or telling of her
8 Although this article focuses primarily on the lawyering that takes place in the con-
text of litigation, with its prototypical "storytelling" trope, the usefulness of the storytelling
metaphor is not limited to that context. The lawyer hears and tells stories in her other
roles as well: as legislative advocate, deal negotiator, judicial clerk, even judge.
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story, by the lawyer to a specific audience.
Representation is challenging because it demands that the
representor be able to hear and see the client in order adequately to
re-present her story. Without critical reflection, it is virtually impossi-
ble for the lawyer to know - to see, hear, understand - her client,
and, therefore, it is virtually impossible to take that next step of por-
traying her. Too often lawyers unconsciously rely on their knowledge
of and familiarity with the tools of the second step - the language
and rituals of the law - and skip over the first step - attempting to
see and hear their client. The story they tell to the audience outside
the relationship, therefore, is at best a distorted version of the client's
story, and at worst, the lawyer's own version of what he thinks the
client's story is or should be. In neither case is the client herself able
to speak and be heard.9
Effective representation depends on the representee's being able
to tell a story that the representor can hear and understand and thus
present within the legal system in such a way that the client's story
remains her own, even if the lawyer is the one doing the talking. This
challenge deepens for lawyers who seek to represent those who are
marginalized from mainstream American society. 10 Those clients are
oppressed not only by the system in which they are trying to operate,
but also by their lawyer's inability to see and hear them in order ade-
quately to portray them within it. More than just telling a wrong, or
an incomplete, story about the client, the lawyer's attempts to portray
the outside voice without critical reflection further marginalizes the
client by keeping her voice outside the dominant legal discourse.
In her analysis of the post-colonial intellectual's attempts to "re-
present" former colonial subjects,'1 Professor Gayatri Spivak con-
cluded that "the subaltern cannot speak."'1 2 The term "subaltern" has
historically been used to refer to those who are "by definition ...
subject to the authority of dominant powers. ' 13 Sprivak, however,
9 There are plenty of examples of clients resisting this kind of silencing. See, e.g., Lucie
E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hear-
ing of Mrs. G., 38 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).
10 Gayatri Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?", in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION
OF CULTURE 313 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988); Janet E. Ainsworth,
Categories and Culture: On the "Rectification of Names" in Comparative Law, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 19, 26 (1996).
11 Spivak describes "representation" not in a legal context, but rather as the western or
westernized intellectual's attempts to "speak for" and/or "speak as" the former colonial
subjects. Id. at 275-79. Susan Schmeiser introduced me to Spivak's work on representa-
tion, and helped me see its connection to the issues I raise in this piece.
12 Id. at 308. 1 use this analysis, and this term, because, as Spivak uses it, it describes
someone with no access to or within the language of the dominant discourse.
13 Nandini Gunewardena, Reinscribing Subalternity: International Financial Institutions,
Development, and Women's Marginality, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AeF. 201, 203
[Vol. 12:329
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goes further, saying that the "[s]ubaltern [is not] just a classy word for
oppressed, for Other, for somebody who's not getting a piece of the
pie.... In postcolonial terms, everything that has limited or no access
to the cultural imperialism is subaltern - a space of difference.'
14
Spivak explains that by "speaking," she was not referring to "the ac-
tual fact of giving utterance," 15 but rather to the "speech act," which
consists dialogically of both speaking and hearing. 16 That is, "even
when the subaltern makes an effort to the death to speak, she is not
able to be heard" by the post-colonial intellectual, and thus is not able
to "complete the speech act."' 17 Spivak contends that without a "per-
sistent critique" of our practice, 18 attempts by those of us within the
dominant system to represent the subaltern, or those without access to
the system, are problematic and counter-productive since such at-
tempts "further underscore[] the subaltern's political marginality.' 19
This is what she calls the "problem of representation.
'20
Spivak's analysis of the problems inherent in attempts to re-
present the subaltern might be applied to the attempts by lawyers to
represent outsiders in the legal system. A particularly dramatic exam-
ple of this tension is that of the transgender client seeking legal repre-
sentation. Not only marginalized by gender and sexual norms, and
thus economically, politically and socially disadvantaged, the trans-
gender client eludes description by our very language itself. From the
insufficiency of pronouns to more general category confusion, at-
tempting to represent a transgender client provides lawyers with an
opportunity to confront their complacency in the process of rendering
a human life into a legally cognizable story.
(2002-03).
14 Interview with Leon de Kock, New Nation Writers Conference in South Africa, in
ARIEL: REV. INT'L ENG. LITERATURE, July 1992, at 29-47.
15 Gayatri Spivak, Subaltern Talk: Interview with the Editors, in THE SPIVAK READER
287, 289 (Donna Landry & Gerald MacLean eds., 1996).
16 Id. at 292.
17 Id. at 292; see also JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 69 (2004).
18 Gayatri Spivak, Questions of Multi-culturalism, in THE POST-COLONIAL CRITIC: IN-
TERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES 59, 63 (1990).
19 Gunewardena, supra note 13, at 202; see also Angela Harris, Bad Subjects: The Prac-
tice of Theory and the Constitution of Identity in Legal Culture, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J.
515, 522 (2003) ("The struggle of subalterns against (and sometimes only within) the
double bind of being expected to act as a subject and being treated as incapable of sub-
jecthood has been the law .... The law claims to listen to subaltern voices . . . [y]et in
practice, projects undertaken in the name of equality and respect silence those voices.").
20 Spivak, supra note 18, at 63 ("It is not a solution, the idea of the disenfranchised
speaking for themselves, or the radical critics speaking for them; this question of represen-
tation, self-representation, representing others, is a problem.").
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II. WHY THE SUBALTERN CANNOT SPEAK: THE SYSTEM OF
OFFICIAL STORIES
Why can't those outside mainstream society "complete the
speech act"? In short, because those inside mainstream society are
not able to hear them. Insiders are able meaningfully to hear only
those stories that they have heard before: the "official stories.
21
When an outsider tells a story that doesn't fit in to the insider's under-
standing of the world, the insider tends either not to believe the out-
sider, or to recast the outsider's story into language and context that
make sense to the insider. In so doing, the insider erases the out-
sider's story. She silences him.
This silencing is particularly invidious because it acts not only to
silence this particular outsider, but also to maintain the system of offi-
cial stories that causes the silencing in the first place. The power and
irony of this system is that as long as the official stories are the only
ones that can be heard (believed) and thus retold, even the stories
about those outside the system are accessible only through what Spi-
vak calls "texts . . . from the other side," 22 that is, texts written by
insiders about the lives of outsiders. This system of "texts from the
other side" - which make up the dominant legal discourse, and in-
clude legal documents, language, rituals - operates as one of what
Foucault called "regimes of truth."'23 These "regimes of truth" serve
to "legitimize what can be said, who has the authority to speak, and
what is sanctioned as true."'24 Another way to describe hegemony,
then, is that the insiders - the dominant group - have so effectively
communicated their versions of reality to the rest of society that those
stories have become embedded in what can be called "common
sense," or "the natural order."'25
In this way, the oppression of those outside the dominant dis-
course occurs through "an ongoing system that is mediated by well-
intentioned people acting as agents of oppression, usually uncon-
sciously, by simply going about their daily lives."' 26 Those outside this
system of official stories are oppressed not only by overt acts of dis-
crimination. Rather, oppression works, more insidiously, through
simple and routine acceptance by those both within and outside the
system that the official stories are in fact the only true and valuable
21 See notes 3 and 4, supra, and sources cited therein.
22 Spivak, supra note 15, at 306-7.
23 FOUCAULT, 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (1980); see also TEACHING FOR DIVER-






stories, and that anything but those stories carry less, if any, legal va-
lidity. The oppression occurs because we don't identify, examine, or
ultimately challenge the assumptions underlying what we have come
to accept as common sense. An examination of the attempts of a
transgender client to navigate the legal system provides a valuable op-
portunity to unpack and challenge the assumptions that drive the "re-
gime of truth" about gender and sexual identity. We'll see in Section
III that such an examination further reveals that lawyers who operate
as insiders within the legal system, but do so critically and with self-
reflection, are able to maneuver among the "texts from the other
side" and disrupt this "regime of truth," thus creating the opportunity
for their clients to speak and be heard by those inside the system.
A. Texts from the Other Side: The Official Stories
Courts take one of two paths when confronted with transgender
plaintiffs and/or defendants. They either defer to scientific and medi-
cal definitions and explanations of gender and gender "deviance" or
"non-conformity," or they describe and adopt notions of "natural
law," or even creationism, to determine the gender identity of the
transgender individual in their courtroom. In going down either one
of these paths, courts avoid the opportunity actually to decide these
cases based on the facts before them - this plaintiff with this particu-
lar story desiring this particular result - choosing instead to punt ei-
ther to science or to "the natural order." The law as an independent
basis for adjudication becomes eclipsed by these other "regimes of
truth." The official legal stories, therefore, are quite tenuous as such,
and vulnerable to manipulation and transformation by the observant
and critical advocate.
In the meantime, however, the official stories hold. They are,
first, that gender is binary - that is, everyone is either a man or a
woman - second, that gender is determinable using specific criteria,
and third, that gender can be changed only under very rare and clearly
identified and identifiable conditions. Underlying these stories are
two non-legal official stories: the medical and scientific community's
definition of "transsexual" and "gender identity disorder," and the
standards of care for treating these conditions. In this section, I will
examine these official stories first by describing the official story
about gender itself and then by examining the texts that describe and
enforce its rigid binary nature. 27 In so doing, I will explore the as-
27 My purpose in reviewing the cases that follow is not to describe the multiple chal-
lenges faced by transgender people trying to operate in the world, but rather to describe
how they are referred to, categorized and defined by those who write and thus perpetuate
the official stories. For analyses of the actual legal hurdles faced by transgender plaintiffs
Spring 2006]
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sumptions underlying these stories, and show how those assumptions
work to reinforce the dominant discourse about gender.
1. The Background Stories
Scientists and doctors agree that gender is more than a simple
anatomical fact, and that no single criterion determines a person's
gender.28 Indeed, the scientific and medical communities suggest that
there are seven traits that make up gender identity: 1) chromosomes;
2) gonads; 3) hormones; 4) internal reproductive organs; 5) external
genitalia; 6) secondary sexual characteristics; and 7) self identity.
29
The English legal system first adopted this scientific and medical
description of gender in 1970 in Corbett v. Corbett, 30 where the court
described gender determination as based on "(i) chromosomal factors,
(ii) gonadal factors, (iii) genital factors, and (iv) psychological fac-
seeking fairness in employment, the right to marry, the right to retain custody of their
children, the right to asylum, the right to public benefits, the right to treatment and/or
accommodations in prison, etc., see, e.g., Melissa Aubin, Defying Classification: Intestacy
Issues for Transsexual Surviving Spouses, 82 OR. L. REV. 1155 (2003); Richard E. Blum &
Barbara Ann Perina, Why Welfare is a Queer Issue, 26 N.Y.U REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 201
(2000-2001); Helen Y. Chang, My Father is a Woman, Oh No!: The Failure of the Courts to
Uphold Individual Substantive Due Process Rights for Transgender Parents Under the Guise
of the Best Interest of the Child, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 649 (2003); Taylor Flynn, Pro-
tecting Transgender Families: Strategies for Advocates 30 HUM. RTs. MAG. 11 (2003); Eliza-
beth Loeb, Walking While Trans, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 73 (2001-2002);
Fatima Mohyuddin, United States Asylum Law in the Context of Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity: Justice for the Transgendered?, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 387 (2001);
Jennifer Levi, Protections for Transgender Employees, 30 HUM. RTS. MAG. 12 (2003); John
M. Ohle, Constructing the Trannie: Transgender People and the Law Footnote, 8 J. GENDER
RACE & JUST. 237 (2004); Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights
vs. The Cider House Rules: Transgenders Struggle with the Courts over What Clothing They
Are Allowed to Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They are Allowed to Use on the Job,
Their Right to Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
133 (2000); Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031; Phyllis
Randolph Frye & Katrina C. Rose, Responsible Representation of Your First Transgendered
Client, 66 TEX. B.J. 558 (2003); Katrina C. Rose, Sign of a Wave? The Kansas Court of
Appeals Rejects Texas Simplicity in Favor of Transsexual Reality, 70 UMKC L. REV. 257
(2001); Katrina C. Rose, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: The Fourth Court of Ap-
peals Opens Pandora's Box by Closing the Door on Transsexuals' Right to Marry, 9 LAW &
SEXUALITY 1 (1999-2000); Darren Rosenblum, "Trapped" in Sing Sing: Transgendered
Prisoners Caught in the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499 (2000); Symposium,
Current Issues in Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Law, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 137 (2000-2001).
28 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision Be-
tween Law and Biology, 41 ARIz. L. REV. 265, 278 (1999).
29 Id.; see also Chang, supra note 28, at 666 (listing the several factors that make up
sexual identity as chromosomes, gonads, internal morphology, external morphology, hor-
mones, phenotype, gender of rearing, gender role, and gender identity and mentioning that
there is not always perfect harmony between these factors); Darren Rosenblum, supra note
28, at 504.
30 Corbett v. Corbett, (1970) 2 Eng. Rep. 33 (P.).
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tors."'31 American courts were quick to follow, 32 and have remained
fairly consistent in relying on this definition since then.33 The official
story - legal and otherwise - about gender is thus that there are
multiple factors that go into its determination, but that it is determina-
ble and binary: one is either male or female. The only question is
which, and that depends on the presence, absence, or extent of the
various factors described.
Scientists and doctors have also agreed that for a small number of
people "concerns, uncertainties, and questions about gender identity
persist during [their] development [and] become so intense as to seem
to be the most important aspect of [their] li[ves], or prevent the estab-
lishment of a relatively unconflicted gender identity. ' 34 When these
people "meet specific criteria in one of two official nomenclatures -
the International Classifications of Diseases - 10 (ICD-10) or the Di-
agnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders - Fourth Edition
(DSM-IV) ' '35 they are diagnosed as suffering from a form of "gender
identity disorder" or GID.
36
The ICD-10 provides five diagnoses for GID,37 including
transsexualism, which has three criteria: "1. The desire to live and be
accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually accompanied by the
wish to make his or her body as congruent as possible with the pre-
ferred sex through surgery and hormone treatment; 2. The transsexual
identity has been present persistently for at least two years; 3. The
disorder is not a symptom of another mental disorder or a chromo-
somal abnormality. ' ' 38 For its part, the DSM-IV has three distinct di-
agnoses for GID, depending on the age of the patient, and other
criteria. 39 The basic diagnostic criteria are: "A. A strong and persis-
tent cross-gender identification (not merely a desire for any perceived
cultural advantages of being the other sex) ... B. Persistent discom-
fort with his or her sex or sense of inappropriateness in the gender
role of that sex .... C. The disturbance is not concurrent with an inter-
31 Id.
32 Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
33 See, e.g., In re Gardiner, 22 P.3d 1086, 1110 (Kan Ct. App. 2001); In the Matter of
Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 73 (Md. 2003); Rentos v. OCE-Office Systems, No. 95 Civ. 7908 LAP,
1996 WL 737215 (S.D.N.Y Dec. 24, 1996).
34 HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA Ass'N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 2 (6th ed. 2001).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES F64, F64.1,
F64.2, F64.8 (10th rev. 2003), available at http://www3.who.int/icd/vollhtm2003/fr-icd.htm.
38 Id. at F64.
39 AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIS-
ORDERS: DSM-IV 302.6, 302.85, 302.6 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
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sex condition .... D. The disturbance causes clinically significant dis-
tress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas
of functioning.
40
The official story about gender thus gives rise inexorably to an-
other official story, this one about gender "deviance," as defined by
these scientific and medical texts. This story includes a description of
the symptoms of GID. For example, the DSM-IV describes the child-
hood play of adult patients: boys with GID "particularly enjoy play-
ing house, drawing pictures of beautiful girls and princesses, and
watching television or videos of their favorite female characters....
They avoid rough and tumble play and competitive sports and have
little interest in cars and trucks. ' 41 Girls with GID "prefer boys'
clothing and short hair," are interested in "contact sports, rough-and-
tumble play."' 42 So kids who played with "gender deviant" toys grow
up to be "gender deviants." And the reverse is true too: adults who
have GID must have played with "gender deviant" toys.
43
But what do boys and girls without GID do? Nowhere in any of
the medical and scientific texts does there appear a description of the
symptoms of someone who doesn't have GID, i.e., someone who has
an "ordered" gender identity. Clearly that's because we all know
what "normal" gender identity looks like: it just is. Obviously, an
adult with "normal" gender identity played with "gender appropriate"
toys. "Normal" boys play with trucks and girls play with dolls. It's
common sense.
Having identified the condition of "Gender Identity Disorder,"
the scientific and medical communities set about developing rules for
how to treat it. Beginning in 1979, a group of doctors formed the
Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria Association which
developed standards of care for "the Hormonal and Surgical Sex Re-
assignment of Gender Dysphoric Persons." 44 Called simply the Harry
Benjamin Standards of Care, these have become the protocol for diag-
nosing and treating those who "suffer" from the conditions described
in the DSM and the ICD-10. The standards involve a "triadic treat-




43 Spade, supra note 2, at 24.
44 HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA Ass'N, supra note 34, at 1; see also
Sandy Stone, "The 'Empire' Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto," in BODY GUARDS:
THE CULTURAL POLInCS OF GENDER AMBIGUITY 8-10 (Kristina Straub & Julia Epstein
eds., 1991), available at http://www.sandystone.comlempire-strikes-back, (describing the
Stanford Gender Dysphoria Clinic).
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of living as a member of the opposite sex,45 and sex reassignment sur-
gery.46 Patients with gender identity disorder might undergo any of
the following five kinds of treatment: diagnostic assessment, psycho-
therapy, real-life experience, hormone therapy, and surgical therapy.
4 7
In order to be eligible for this treatment, the patient must first be
diagnosed with gender identity disorder.48 Such diagnosis takes place
along the lines described earlier, and includes inquiry into the person's
childhood and history as it relates to his or her gender identity. Fol-
lowing diagnosis, the patient must be assessed by a mental health pro-
fessional, who then recommends the kind of treatment the patient
should undergo. 49 To receive hormone therapy, the patient must have
a "documented real-life experience" as the "preferred" gender for at
least three months prior to the start of the hormone treatment. 50 In
the alternative, the patient must have undergone a period of psycho-
therapy "of a duration specified by the mental health professional.
51
To have sex reassignment surgery (rather than just hormone replace-
ment therapy and/or psychotherapy), the patient must have had 12
months of hormone therapy52 and "12 months of successful continu-
ous full time real-life experience. Periods of returning to the original
gender may indicate ambivalence about proceeding and generally
should not be used to fulfill this criterion.
53
In other words, someone assigned male at birth who just wants
hormones has to live "as" a woman for three months. Someone as-
signed male at birth who wants to have surgery has to live "as" a
woman for a year. In both cases, living "as" the preferred gender has
to be "full-time" - no breaks allowed. Breaks would imply that the
patient isn't serious about transitioning, and would result in the pro-
fessional conclusion that the patient isn't entitled to the treatment. If
as someone assigned male at birth, you can live "as" a woman for a
whole year, you must really "be" a woman, and therefore are entitled
to change your body accordingly. If you can't live "as" a woman for a
whole year, you must really "be" a man, and therefore are not entitled
to the surgery. Underlying these criteria, of course, is the threshold
official story about gender: that it is binary. Everyone is either a man
45 See HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA Ass'N, supra note 34, at 17, for an
explanation of what this means, and its purpose.
46 Id. at 3.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 2.
49 Id. at 6.
50 Id. at 13.
51 Id.




or a woman: it's just a matter of figuring out which one.
Not surprisingly, the application of standards in any individual
patient's case is heavily dependent on the opinions of doctors and
mental health professionals. These medical opinions, in turn, are ar-
ticulated in terms of official "Standards of Care for Gender Identity
Disorders" ("the SOC"). 54 The Fourth Version of the SOC, published
in 1990, made a point of warning doctors against being swayed by the
patient's own descriptions of his or her condition or wishes. Noting
that hormonal and surgical sex reassignment is extreme, Principal 1 of
that version states that such treatments "may be requested by persons
experiencing short-termed delusions or beliefs which may later be
changed and reversed." As a result, Standard 1 of the Fourth Version
provides, "Hormonal and/or surgical sex reassignment on demand
(i.e., justified simply because patient has requested such procedures)
is contraindicated." Rather the doctor or clinical behavioral scientist
must make her own "careful evaluation of the patient's reasons for
requesting such services and evaluation of the beliefs and attitudes
upon which such reasons are based. ' 55 Such analysis "requires skills
not usually associated with the professional training of persons other
than clinical behavioral scientist."
56
Indeed, such scientists "must often rely on possibly unreliable or
invalid sources of information (patient's verbal reports or the verbal
reports of the patient's families and friends) in making clinical deci-
sions."' 57 Therefore, Standard 7 in the Fourth Version is that the
clinical behavior scientist must obtain peer review - a second opinion
- before the treatment can take place. 58 In other words, because the
experiences of the patient himself, and those of the people closest to
him, are "unreliable and invalid," only a clinically trained medical
professional who has known the patient for at least 3 months, and who
is backed up by another clinically trained medical professional who
has examined the patient "on at least one occasion" 59 can decide
whether the patient is entitled to the treatment requested.
The most recent version of the SOC, the Sixth, published in 2001,
continues to rely on medical recommendations and peer review as
conditions precedent for receiving treatment. Before getting hormone
therapy or breast surgery, the patient must present the prescribing
doctor with a "documentation letter" from the mental health profes-
54 HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS'N, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR
GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 5 (4th ver. 1990).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 8.




sional who assessed him. The letter must contain seven specifically
identified points about the patient, his diagnosis, his relationship and
treatment with the mental health professional, how well he has com-
plied with the treatment so far, etc. 60 In order to have genital surgery,
the patient must present two "letters of recommendation" from
mental health professionals, at least one of whom is a Ph.D. clinical
psychologist or psychiatrist. At least one of the letters should be "an
extensive report" of the patient.61 The point of all this documentation
is for the medical establishment to confirm that this person actually is
a "patient" who suffers from the identifiable and diagnosable disease
of "gender identity disorder," and is eligible, therefore, for treatment.
These standards should be understood as "texts from the other
side" - narratives by "insiders" about "outsiders." As such, unsur-
prisingly, they uphold the official story about gender: it is binary and
determinable (by scientists and doctors). For those very few people
who aren't happy with the gender they were assigned at birth, there is
a medical diagnosis and treatment - again, by scientists and doctors
- to help them either resolve their issues with that gender, or to tran-
sition them to the other gender. Which direction the treatment goes is
also to be determined by the scientists and doctors. These stories be-
came official because they are built on assumptions and stereotypes
about gender roles, childhood development, adult sexual behavior,
self-presentation and identity that are deeply embedded in the "com-
mon sense" understandings about men and women. As such, the con-
clusions are very difficult to rebut without unpacking and dismantling
the entire framework - "regime of truth" - about gender and sexual
identity.
2. The Law's Stories
The legal system has for the most part adopted this official story,
incorporating into case law both the DSM descriptions of the condi-
tions,62 and the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care for their treat-
ment.63 A minority of jurisdictions, however, have either rejected or
ignored these official stories in favor of another official story about
gender as "God given" and thus both eminently determinable and ul-
timately unchangeable. In this section I will examine how the law -
as embodied by appellate judges in three specific cases from within
the last ten years - has treated transgender people in the legal sys-
60 HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA ASS'N, supra note 34, at 7.
61 Id. at 8.
62 See, e.g., Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F.Supp.2d 156 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2002), Heilig, 816
A.2d. 68.
63 See e.g., Kosilek, 221 F. Supp.2d at 156.
Spring 2006]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
tern, and show both the rigidity and the fragility of official stories
about gender. These three cases illustrate the dominant legal analysis
and approach to stories about gender, the background that the law
students described infra had to account for in their representation.
In 2003, in In the Matter of Robert Wright Heilig, the Maryland
Court of Appeals held inter alia that "the Circuit Court had jurisdic-
tion to determine and declare that a person had changed from one
gender to another." 64 The lower court had refused to enter an order
changing the plaintiff's gender identity from male to female, holding
that "gender had physical manifestations that were not subject to
modification. ' 65 The Court of Appeals overturned the order and re-
manded the case back to the Circuit Court to allow petitioner the op-
portunity to "offer further proof ... that he had sufficiently effected
that change to be entitled to such a determination and declaration."
66
The bulk of the Court's opinion is spent describing the medical
and scientific literature on "transsexualism" and its treatment. Apolo-
gizing for producing what sounds like a medical text, the Court ex-
plains that "some of the concepts that underlie the views espoused by
transsexuals who seek recognition of gender change [e.g., the plaintiff
in this case] are the subject of debate, in both the medical and legal
communities. ' 67 This language harkens back to the Standard of
Care's "possibly unreliable or invalid sources of information" 68 - i.e.,
those stories told by and about people who fall outside the confines of
gender's binarism. The Court goes on to explain that because of the
contentiousness of those "views" (i.e., the stories of the actual plaintiff
and others like him), "unguided by expert [i.e., medical and scientific]
testimony, there is no way that we could evaluate [the concepts]
properly." 69
The Court then describes the question before it thus: under what
circumstances may a court "declare one's gender to be other than
what is officially recorded and [what] criteria [must] be used in mak-
ing any such declaration[?] ''70 To answer, the Court defers to another
field and its experts:
[W]hether and how gender can be changed is [a question] where the
law depends upon and, to a large extent, must follow medical [in-
cluding psychological] facts. Any reasoned legal conclusion respect-
ing an asserted change in one's gender must therefore be based on
64 Heilig, 816 A.2d at 68.
65 Id. at 69.
66 Id. at 70.
67 Id. at 72.
68 See HARRY BENJAMIN INT'L GENDER DYSPHORIA Ass'N, supra note 54.
69 Heilig, 816 A.2d at 72.
70 Id. at 79.
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admissible evidence of medical fact.
71
Noting that "surgery seems to be a requirement for recognition of
gender change" in multiple contexts, 72 the Court concludes that the
petitioner has the burden of showing "sufficient medical evidence of
both the relevant criteria for determining gender and of the fact that,
applying those criteria, he has completed a permanent and irreversible
change from male to female.
'73
In other words, the court punts. It finds the determination of
gender beyond its area of expertise because there are too many fac-
tors involved, so defers entirely to those who know about such things,
i.e. the medical and scientific communities. If the plaintiff can come
back with "admissible evidence of medical fact" which has been deter-
mined by the medical and scientific communities to lead to the conclu-
sion that gender has been changed, the court will go along with that
conclusion. Short of such evidence, there can be no legal determina-
tion. If the plaintiff's own story doesn't contain the medical evidence,
it is inherently suspect because it challenges the official story that gen-
der is binary and determinable by specific criteria. Therefore, it can-
not be heard in a legally significant way: it is not "admissible
evidence."
Three years earlier, in In the Matter of the Estate of Marshall G.
Gardiner, the Court of Appeals of Kansas considered the question of
whether a marriage "between a post-operative male-to-female
transsexual and a male" was prohibited under Kansas' prohibition
against same-sex marriage.74 To answer the question, the Court re-
manded the case to the District Court to determine whether the
"transsexual was a female at the time she obtained [the] marriage li-
cense."'75 The Gardiner case was brought by the son of Marshall Gar-
diner. Marshall Gardiner died intestate; the applicable state laws of
intestate succession instructed that his estate go to his wife, a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual named J'Noel. Marshall's son
claimed that the marriage was void and that he was thus the sole heir
to his father's estate. The record showed that J'Noel's transition from
male to female had been completed before she met Marshall and that
he (Marshall) knew about her sex reassignment. The record showed
further that the two met in May, 1998, and were married in Septem-
71 Id. at 87.
72 Id. at 86.
73 Id. at 87.
74 Gardiner 22 P.3d at 1092. The Supreme Court of Kansas eventually reversed this
decision, holding that a person's sex could not be changed in the eyes of the law, regardless
of what the medical and scientific evidence showed. In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan.
2002).
75 Gardiner 22 P.3d at 1086.
Spring 2006]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
ber, 1998, after they had been sexually intimate, and after J'Noel had
told Marshall about her "prior history as a male. ' 76 Marshall died in
August, 1999, after a relationship that the court noted "appears stable
and compatible.
'77
Noting prosaically that "on occasion, issues or individuals come
before a court which do not fit into a bilateral set of classifications,"
78
the court nevertheless endeavors to fit J'Noel Gardiner into one side
of the bilateral set of gender classifications. To do so, the Court re-
views the "relevant" scientific and medical literature on gender, ho-
mosexuality, hormonal disorders and gender disorders. It also details
J'Noel's extensive "journey from perceiving herself as one sex to the
sex her brain suggests she was," 79 a journey that began in 1991, en-
tailed multiple surgeries of all kinds, and culminated in 1995, although
she continues to take hormones. 80
Despite all this evidence, including J'Noel's testimony that she
was born with a "'birth defect' - a penis and testicles" and had al-
ways "viewed herself as a girl but had a penis and testicles," 81 how-
ever, the Court cannot answer the question of whether J'Noel was
female at the time she obtained the marriage license. It remands the
case to the District Court to "consider factors in addition to chromo-
some makeup, including: gonadal sex, internal morphologic sex, exter-
nal morphologic sex, hormonal sex, phenotopic sex, assigned sex and
gender of rearing, and sexual identity. ' 82 The Court cautions, how-
ever, that this list "should not preclude the consideration of other cri-
teria as science advances."8 3
Again, we see the court deferring to the medical and scientific
"determination" of gender and its binarism in order to come to a legal
conclusion about the transgender person standing before it. As with
the Heilig case, the court doesn't consider in a legally significant way
the evidence provided by the transgender witness herself, because her
story challenges the court's understanding of the "regime of truth"
about gender: that it is binary, and determinable according to set med-
ical and scientific criteria. As in the Heilig case, the transgender per-
son before this court presents a narrative that doesn't contain
76 Id. at 1091.
77 Id. at 1110.
78 Id. at 1090.
79 Id. at 1091.
80 This recitation leads the Court to remark admiringly that "regardless of whether one
agrees with the concept of sex reassignment, one must be impressed with the resolve of...
any human being who undergoes such a demanding set of procedures." Id. at 1092.
81 Id. at 1091.




sufficient medical evidence, and therefore it cannot be heard. 84
Two years earlier, a court in Texas, faced with a similar question,
upheld one official story about gender - that it is binary - by re-
jecting the other - that it can be changed. Far from punting to the
medical and scientific communities, the Texas court relied on "com-
mon sense" and the "natural order" to reach its conclusions. In Lit-
tleton v. Prange, the Court of Appeals of Texas held that the
ceremonial marriage between a man and "a transsexual born as a
man, but surgically and chemically altered to have the physical charac-
teristics of a woman," was not valid under Texas law.
85
The Court notes that Christie Lee Littleton, the plaintiff, had
gone through surgical and hormonal treatment to become a woman,
and had legally changed her name and her birth certificate. "She has
made every conceivable effort to make herself a female, including a
surgery that would make most males pale and perspire to contem-
plate. ' 86 And yet, the Court still had to consider the question of
"[w]hether the law will take note of these changes and treat her as if
she had been born a female?" 87 In other words, can the Court see and
hear this particular plaintiff standing before it, having undergone this
series of physical, mental, and psychological changes, and telling the
story of her life as a woman? And the answer, very simply, is no.
Written in a folksy tone, purporting to appeal to the basic under-
standing every Texan has about the facts of life, the opinion notes that
"every schoolchild, even of tender years, is confident he or she can tell
the difference [between a man and a woman], especially if the person
is wearing no clothes. These are observations that each of us makes
early in life[.]" 88 In other words, it's common sense: everyone knows
who's a boy and who's a girl.
84 See also Stone, supra note 44, at 11 ("As with genetic women, transsexuals are infan-
tilized, considered too illogical or irresponsible to achieve true subjectivity, or clinically
erased by diagnostic criteria."). Unlike a traditional tort case where the trial and appeals
courts must hear sufficient "medical" evidence in order to rule on the legal question, these
are cases where the court opts for a medical analogy - relying on the official medical/
scientific story about gender - while the plaintiff him or herself argues that medical and
scientific evidence is only a small part of his or her story. See, e.g., Goins v. West Group,
635 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 2001) (Plaintiff argued, unsuccessfully, that gender designations
should be based on self-image of gender, not biology.).
85 Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); see also In the Matter of the
Application for a Marriage License for Jacob B. Nash and Erin A. Barr, Nos. 2002-T-0149,
2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist. Dec. 31, 2003); In re Ladrach, 32
Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Probate Ct. 1987) (up to the legislature to change
the law). In the Kansas Supreme Court's reversal of Gardiner, the Court cited with ap-
proval the Littleton case. Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 120.
86 Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
87 Id. at 226.
88 Id. at 223-24.
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The Court goes on to explain that the plaintiff, Christie Lee Lit-
tleton, is "medically termed a transsexual,"'8 9 noting with something
close to apology that this is "a term not often heard on the streets of
Texas, nor in its courtrooms." 90 The court concludes, with a down
home shrug of the shoulders, that "courts are wise not to wander too
far into the misty fields of sociological philosophy," 91 and cautions,
with a conspiratorial wink at its audience of pale and perspiring real
men and their real wives, that "there are some things we cannot will
into being. They just are." 92 Clearly, in Texas at least, men are men, a
fact evident to every schoolchild, if not to every doctor.93
What this case shows, however, is that as much as the Texas Court
of Appeals would like it to be true that gender simply "is" and that it
can be determined by a discrete set of criteria, the official story about
gender's binarism is actually quite fragile. In all of the cases de-
scribed, courts either punt to the medical and scientific communities
or rely on the knowledge of "every schoolchild" in order to come to
some clear answer about whether the person standing before them is a
man or a woman. One story views gender as complex and elusive
except to the scientifically trained mind, the other as elementary be-
yond debate, but both rely on the same fundamental assumption: that
gender is binary and decidable. In so doing, they seem to maintain the
official story about gender.
But the act of coming to these conclusions and the effect the texts
have on other insiders in the legal system is actually quite destabilizing
to the very system the appellate courts claim to be upholding. The
fact that courts have to consider these questions at all undermines the
notion that the answers are easily ascertainable: if the outcomes were
obvious, why have a lawsuit at all? An obvious manifestation of this
destabilization is the courts' struggle with the question of how to refer
to the transgender people involved in the cases before them. The
Kosilek case, for example, involves a plaintiff who "suffers from a se-
vere form of a rare, medically recognized, major mental illness - gen-
der identity disorder, '94 but who had not received "any of the forms
of treatment described in the [Harry Benjamin] Standards of Care."
95
89 Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 231.
92 Id.
93 The Kansas Supreme Court relies on the dictionary to make its point about the obvi-
ousness of gender: "The words "sex," "male," and "female" in everyday understanding do
not encompass transsexuals. The plain, ordinary meaning of "persons of the opposite sex"
contemplates a biological man and a biological woman and not persons who are experienc-
ing gender dysphoria." Gardiner, 42 P.3d at 120.




Before describing in great detail the various protocols of the Stan-
dards of Care, 96 as well as quoting extensively from the DSM,97 the
court addresses, in a footnote, the question of how to refer to the
plaintiff. Recognizing "that it is painful for Kosilek to be referred to
as 'he,"' the court nevertheless "finds that referring to Kosilek by the
male pronoun is necessary to make this Memorandum as clear as pos-
sible."'98 In other words, because the plaintiff was assigned male at
birth and had not yet been treated by the protocols established by the
Standards of Care, "he" was "still" male, and therefore the rules of
clarity dictated that the male pronoun be used. 99
Similarly, in the Heilig case, the Court used the masculine pro-
noun "because of our conclusion that petitioner has not yet estab-
lished an entitlement to a determination that his gender has been
effectively changed from male to female."100 The Court goes on to
explain that it chose to do this "not to disparage petitioner's undoubt-
edly sincere belief that his transition is, indeed, complete, but simply
to be consistent with our conclusion that he has yet to offer sufficient
evidence to warrant that determination as a legal matter.'' 1 1
A similar analysis takes place in those cases where the court uses
the pronoun associated with the transgender person's "new" gender.
In most cases where courts choose to use the "new" pronoun, they do
so based on the presence of one or more of the criteria set out in the
medical and scientific literature: e.g. the transgender person has un-
dergone surgery,102 or has been diagnosed with gender identity disor-
der.10 3 In a few cases, courts will use the "new" pronoun based on the
96 Id. at 159, 166-68. The Standards of Care are actually an exhibit to the record.
97 Id. at 163.
98 Id. at 163, n.1.
99 Never mind also that the court does refer to the plaintiff by "his" chosen feminine
name of Michelle. How does this affect the court's desire for clarity? See also People v.
Olsen, No. 210555, 2001 WL 1342664 *1 (Cal.App.6 Dist. Nov. 1, 2001) (Defendant de-
scribes himself as "preoperative transgender." He hasn't had surgery or hormone therapy.
Despite parties' and witnesses' use of feminine pronoun, court notes that it will "use the
masculine gender throughout this opinion."); Long v. Nix, 877 F.Supp. 1358 (Iowa Dist. Ct.
1995) (noting that plaintiff "claiming to be transsexual" would "like to be referred to as a
female," the court refers to plaintiff as a male "to avoid confusion.").
100 Heilig, 816 A.2d at 71, n.1 (emphasis added).
101 Id.
102 See Sanders v. May Dept. Stores Co., 315 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2003); State v. Nelson,
173 N.J. 417, 803 A.2d 1, 11 n.1 (N.J. 2002) (court refers to defendant as "him" "in the
period before his sexual reassignment operation, and to 'her' in the period after the
operation.").
103 See Doe v. Yunits, No.2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33162199, n.4 (Mass. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30,
2000) ("This court will use female pronouns to refer to plaintiff: a practice which is consis-
tent with plaintiff's gender identity and which is common among mental health and other
professionals who work with transgender clients.").
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transgender person's legal name change,'10 4 though in those cases
there has also been a diagnosis of gender identity disorder. In only a
very few cases have courts chosen which pronoun to use based only on
the transgender person's stated or apparent preference.
10 5
These cases clearly adopt and uphold the medical and scientific
diagnoses and treatments that both derive from and drive the binary
system of gender. The courts almost uniformly reject the self-presen-
tation and identification of the transgender people before them, ren-
dering them invisible and silent to the eyes and ears of the law. But in
so doing, these decisions also reveal the complexity of the questions
presented. In being forced to think about which pronoun to use, and
then to explain their choices, judges are also forced to recognize and
acknowledge this complexity. If gender determination is such a matter
of common sense or scientific certainty, why do you have to drop a
footnote about why you're using "he" instead of "she?" These "texts
from the other side" then - both the non-legal Standards of Care and
the legal cases which rely on them - begin to reveal the porousness
of the official stories about gender's binarism.
B. Their Effects
As we have seen, the law's system of official stories creates and
perpetuates the "regime of truth" that gender is binary and determi-
nable by specific medical and scientific criteria or common sense.
That is the dominant discourse around gender, and anyone who iden-
tifies or is identified as not clearly within one of gender's two binary
poles falls squarely outside that dominant discourse. Because their
stories don't translate into one of the official texts, they can't be
heard. In Spivak's terms, those outside the dominant discourse about
gender thus cannot complete the speech act: they cannot engage in a
true transaction between speaker and listener.
Perhaps most importantly, the official stories told by the ICD-10,
the DSM-IV, and the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care force people
to "rigidly conform.., to medical providers' opinions about what 'real
104 See, e.g., LaFleur v. Bird-Johnson Co., No. 93-703, 1994 WL 878831, at 1 (Mass. Su-
perior Ct. Nov. 3, 1994); State v. McClain, 1989 WL 5441, at 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27,
1989).
105 See, e.g., Tates v. Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP P. 2003 WL 23864868 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
March 11, 2003); Lie v. Sky Publishing Corp., No. 013117J, 2002 WL 31492397 (Mass.
Super. Oct. 7, 2002); Goins 635 N.W.2d at 717; v. Bell, 194 Misc.2d 774 (NY Sup. Ct. 2003);
Doe Cucco v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 328 F.Supp.2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Johnson v. Fresh
Mark, 337 F.Supp.2d 996 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Doe v. United Consumer Financial Services,
No. 1:01 CV 1112, 2001 WL 34350174 (N.D.Ohio Nov. 9, 2001); State v. Harrison, No.
42091-7-I., 1998 WL 848076 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1998).
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masculinity' and 'real femininity' mean." 10 6 These medical stories
have two important silencing effects, both of which negate the exper-
iences and often the existence of the transgender individuals attempt-
ing to tell their stories. First, the stories require that transgender
people conform to a specific narrative of their experience of gender.
Second, the dominant discourse demands a particular "living as" the
"opposite" gender. Both of these imperatives can serve to erase the
transgender person's own truth or experience.
First, the diagnosis and treatment of gender identity disorder con-
tained in these texts describe conditions that are often unrelated to
the lived experiences of those actually seeking the treatment. Because
those conditions are requirements of eligibility for the treatment,
those seeking the treatment are forced to deny their own lived reali-
ties and make up narratives - "construct a plausible history" 10
7 -
that render them eligible to receive whatever treatment they are seek-
ing.10 8 In order to get hormone or surgical treatment, Dean Spade
writes, "the scripted transsexual childhood narrative must be per-
formed, and the GID diagnosis accepted." 10 9 He describes his early
efforts to get a surgery authorization letter: the mental health profes-
sional he met with asked when he first knew he was different. Spade
responded that he had grown up poor and on welfare, and not Chris-
tian, and with a single mother, and later as a foster child, and a femi-
nist, and that all those things had always made him feel that he was
different. The counselor's "facial expression tells me this isn't what he
wanted to hear, but why should I engage a narrative in which my gen-
der performance has been my most important difference in my life? It
hasn't... Does this mean I'm not real enough for surgery?"'110 Spade
106 Stone, supra note 44, at 12.
107 Id.
108 Spade, supra note 2, at 19; see also Stone, supra note 44, at 12; Stryker, supra note 2,
at 150.
109 Spade, supra note 2, at 25; see also Stone, supra note 44, at 13 ('Suppose you could be
a man [or woman] in every way except for your genitals; would you be content?' There are
several possible answers, but only one is clinically correct."); RIKI ANNE WILCHINS, READ
My Lips: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER 63 (1997) (containing the fol-
lowing dialogue:
"How do you know you want rhinoplasty, a nose job?" He inquires, fixing me with a
penetrating stare.
"Because, I reply, suddenly unable to raise my eyes above his brown wingtips, "I've
always felt like a small-nosed woman trapped in a large-nosed body."
"And how long have you felt this way?" He leans forward, sounding as if he knows
the answer and needs only to hear the words.
"Oh, since I was five or six, doctor, practically all my life."
"Then you have rhino-identity disorder," the shoetops state flatly. My body sags in
relief. "But first," he goes on, "we want you to get letters from two psychiatrists and
live as a small-nosed woman for three years .. just to be sure.").
110 Spade, supra note 2, at 19-20.
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goes on to ask "how do I decide whether to look back on my life
through the tranny childhood lens, tell the stories about being a boy
for Halloween, about not playing with dolls? What are the costs of
participation in this selective recitation?" '111
The second way the official stories silence and distort the lived
experiences of those seeking treatment emerges from the Standard of
Care's requirement of "successful real-life experience:" proof that the
person seeking treatment can "inhabit and perform the new gender
category 'successfully.'I 1 12 As we saw earlier, assessment of whether a
"patient" is or should be eligible for hormone or surgical treatment
includes a determination by the mental health professional of how
well he or she can live "as" a member of the preferred gender, rather
than stand out as a "transsexual." In other words, transgender women
must "succeed" as women, rather than as drag queens; and trans-
gender men must "succeed" as men, rather than as butch dykes.
113
Indeed, as Sandy Stone points out, "the highest purpose of the
transsexual is to erase h/erself, to fade into the 'normal' population as
soon as possible. ' 114 Thus, the binary system is maintained by absorb-
ing those who fit within its terms and rejecting those who don't.
These official stories thus render invisible all those who did not
play with stereotypically inappropriate gender toys as children and
who don't "make it" as members of the "preferred" gender. They
privilege only those who fit squarely into the "regime of truth" about
gender as binary by being so clearly "wrong" "as" the gender they
were born into. Those people are very likely to be "successful" as the
other gender, because it is the "right" one for them. 15 This is the
traditional and stereotypical idea of a transsexual: someone born into
the wrong body, who struggles to escape that mistake his or her whole
life, and is finally "reborn" into the "right" body after surgery.
11 6
But that experience does not describe the lives of all transgender
people who seek medical intervention. And its requirement that it is
the only "real" experience silences all the stories of those who do not
share it, because only with that silence - or worse, the invented
"plausible histories" - will they gain access to the treatment they
seek. Sandy Stone describes how "[e]mergent polyvocalities of lived
experience, never represented in the discourse but present at least in
111 Id. at 20.
112 Id. at 25.
113 See Shannon Mintner, Do Transsexuals Dream of Gay Rights? Getting Real about
Transgender Inclusion in the Gay Rights Movement, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. Rrs. 589, 609
(2000).
114 Stone, supra note 44, at 12.
115 See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 67.
116 See Stone, supra note 44, at 2, 4.
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potential, disappear; the berdache and the stripper, the tweedy house-
wife and the mujerado, the mah'u and the rock star, are still the same
story after all, if we only try hard enough." 1 7 All the other lived ex-
periences become eclipsed by the "same story," the one that supports
"the old constructed positions" of gender's binary poles. Stone de-
scribes this eclipsing as "expensive, and profoundly
disempowering."1
18
C. The Unofficial Stories
So what stories counter the official one? They are the stories that
maintain that gender is fluid, mutable, personal, and "unhooked from
genitals."'1 9 Transgender as a genre provides a location for challeng-
ing gender norms and the binary gender system, a20 "the potential to
map the refigured body onto conventional gender discourse and
thereby disrupt it, to take advantage of the dissonances created by
such a juxtaposition to fragment and reconstitute the elements of gen-
der in new and unexpected geometries."'
21
Being transgender, though, can mean any number of things.
Each transgender person embodies his or her gender identity accord-
ing to his or her own lived experience. Some of those individual sto-
ries might be very much about the binary system, and might sound
very much like the official stories about that system: a man trapped in
a woman's body, a woman who wants to "become" a man.122 For
those, the state of "being" transgender is a transitional phase, and may
remain only an incidental part of the person's identity once the trans-
formation has taken place. For others, though, "being" transgender is
the whole story.123 For them, the whole point is not to transform into
117 Id. at 10-11. "Berdache" has two meanings: one is European, meaning originally a
passive homosexual, but more commonly a "'pretty' or feminine young boy." The other is
a generic term in many north and south American indigenous cultures to refer to someone
who "holds" both genders at once. "Mah'u" is the Polynesian term for "berdache." http://
www.nu-woman.com/berdache.htm (last visited 2/21/06).
118 Stone, supra note 44, at 12.
119 Ruth Hubbard, Gender and Genitals: Constructs of Sex and Gender, in CURRENT
CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 50 (Dallas Deny ed., 1998); see also KATE BORN-
STEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN AND THE REST OF US (1994), Holly Boswell,
The Transgender Paradigm Shift toward Free Expression, in CURRENT CONCEPTS IN TRANS-
GENDER IDENTITY 55 (Dallas Denny ed., 1998); LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WAR-
RIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN OF ARC TO RUPAUL (1996); GORDENE OLGA
MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER NATION (1994); M. ROTHBLATT, THE APARTHEID OF SEX: A
MANIFESTO ON THE FREEDOM OF GENDER 164 (1995); Spade, supra note 2, at 15.
120 Spade, supra note 2.
121 Stone, supra note 44, at 12.
122 See, e.g., Spade, supra note 2, at 22 ("Some have a self-narrative resembling the med-
ical model of transsexuality, some do not.").
123 See, e.g., Spade, supra note 2, Stryker, supra note 2.
Spring 2006]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
one of the binary gender categories and thus disappear.124
And this multiplicity, this "chaos of lived, gendered experi-
ence,"1125 provides the ultimate challenge to the official story about the
binary gender system. As with so many other movements against op-
pression, individual members of the oppressed group counter the
dominant discourse by simply living their lives - and talking about
it.126 As Holly Boswell points out, "this new paradigm of gender is
coming from, and finally being articulated by, the very people who are
living it."'1 27 The stories told by three transgender clients, in different
contexts and situations, illustrate the complexity and richness of the
lived experience described by these theorists.128 As such they provide
vivid counter stories to those told by the appellate courts described
above about gender's rigid and binary nature.
1 29
A client in a domestic violence clinic, Sheila identified as a man,
and described herself as "a boy trapped in a woman's body." She
came to the clinic both to obtain a civil protection order against her
wife, and to defend against the civil protection order her wife had filed
against her. She told the students they could use female pronouns to
describe and refer to her because everyone else in her life does. Her
kids call her "Papi", she married her female partner in a ceremony
that described and consecrated the union between a husband and
wife. Yet she uses the women's bathroom. She uses the same name
- which is clearly feminine - for all purposes. She never refers to
herself as gay or lesbian, but talks about being part of the gay and
drag communities. When Sheila came into the front office for her first
meeting with the students, the administrative assistant called the stu-
dents and said, "I think your client is here. He says his name is
Sheila." Indeed, the students say Sheila looks like "a teenage boy."
For her, identification as a boy was a big part of her defense
124 Spade, supra note 2, at 22 ("[P]eople I've met share with me what my counselors do
not: a commitment to gender self-determination and respect for all expressions of gender.
Certainly not all trans people would identify with this principle, but I think it makes better
sense as a basis for identity than the ability to pass "full-time" or the amount of cross-
dressing one did as a child.").
125 Stone, supra note 44, at 11.
126 See, e.g., CATHERINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103 (1987) (reflecting on
sexual harassment as a legal claim).
127 Holly Boswell, supra note 119, at 56.
128 I describe these clients' stories here, but hold off on any analysis of the students'
reactions and actions until the third section.
129 I compiled these stories from interviews with many students in a variety of clinics.
Unless otherwise indicated, when phrases appear in quotation marks, the source of the
quote is the student not the client, as neither I nor the direct supervisors in these cases had
direct access to the clients. Needless to say - but certainly material for another piece - this
third-hand reporting adds layers of complexity to the analysis, as well as further opportu-
nity for reinterpretation and even silencing on the part of the students.
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against the petition for a civil protection order that her wife had filed:
"A boy would never hit a girl; I was raised that a boy should never
raise his hand to a girl. I would never hit my wife." She was commit-
ted to her marriage as the husband, complete with the gendered con-
struction of a husband's role within a marriage. It was her
responsibility to "take care of" her wife and children, and it was a
personal and private responsibility that she took very seriously and
which she would never betray by harming any of them.
The other part of her story was that a husband would not go to
court to seek protection from his wife. Men don't get hit by their
wives, and if they do, they certainly don't drag it out in public and ask
for the court's protection. She felt humiliated and emasculated by the
idea of going in front of a judge and saying, "my wife hit me and I
need protection." Moreover, she felt that her wife knew this and had
betrayed her by bringing the action against her and forcing her to
come into court to defend herself. More than anything, though, she
felt insulted and indignant that her wife had brought their family life
into the public arena. "I can't believe this is happening, I can't believe
we're dealing with this in a courtroom." Her wife had betrayed her
more by bringing the legal action than by using violence against her.
One the one hand, Sheila's story could be seen as one that thor-
oughly reinforces the official story about gender, given her patriarchal
views about gender roles within marriage and in society at large. But
Sheila is biologically and genetically female: she has undergone no
hormone or surgical treatment, and has never been diagnosed as hav-
ing GID. She does not identify as a lesbian or as transgender. She is
simply living her life, as someone assigned female at birth, who is
playing traditionally male social and cultural roles. And she describes
no contradiction or conflict in this. How does this fit in to the "regime
of truth" about gender's binarism? What does this story do to the
common sense understanding of gender as something that can be de-
termined easily, either by schoolchildren and/or by medical and scien-
tific criteria?
MS, a client in an asylum clinic, presented initially as a gay man
seeking asylum based on past persecution as an effeminate man or
based on his homosexuality. The students knew from the intake doc-
uments that "there was a transgender issue." Dressed in "feminine"
"men's" clothes - tight jeans and a brown flowered shirt - the client
introduced himself as Mario Santiago, saying "this is the name I use."
He worked at a fast food restaurant during the day, and participated
actively at the local gay/lesbian/bisexual/transgender community
center, particularly in their drag beauty pageants. He referred to him-
self using male pronouns, as did the existing court documents. So the
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students did as well.
During the course of the representation, the client's presentation
shifted. In the second or third interview, the client said, "I am Maria
Santos." A few sessions later, one of the students was writing in her
date book, "meeting with Mario," and he corrected her: "No, write
down Maria." Though still dressed in "men's" clothes, the client be-
gan presenting as a woman, referring to himself using female pro-
nouns and by his female name. After those first couple of meetings,
he never talked about his identity as a gay man. Rather, the client
raved about being a woman. He showed them pictures of himself in
the beauty pageants: "I love being a woman," he would say. "I look
so beautiful." He described living his life in two spheres, public and
private. In the public sphere, which included the legal system and,
initially, his lawyers as well, he was "Mario Santiago, effeminate gay
man who worked at a fast food restaurant and wore a brown uni-
form." In the private sphere, which included his work at the commu-
nity center, he was "Maria Santos, beauty queen."
The students struggled with this idea. One asked if he felt like a
woman trapped in a man's body. The client responded, "I don't feel
like I'm trapped. I just feel like a woman." It was hard for them to
call him Maria and to use feminine pronouns because they always saw
him "dressed as a man." They asked him to come to one of their
meetings dressed as a woman. He did not seem comfortable with the
idea, so they didn't push it. However, he invited them with much ex-
citement to attend the Christmas party at the community center. In
that space, he presented as Maria, in full dress. He didn't look like a
woman to them, though, but like a man in drag, complete with the
flamboyant gestures and exaggerated expressions. The students were
stunned: their client was completely transformed. They would not
have recognized him on the street.
Where does MS fall between gender's binary poles? What does
Mario's story tell us about the medical and scientific communities' de-
termination of gender? What does Maria's story reveal about what
makes a woman "real"? As was Sheila's, MS' story is one about self-
presentation and self-identification as someone who doesn't fit within
the medical and scientific and legal stories about gender. As such, it
pushes back against those "texts from the other side," and the "regime
of truth" they support.
Jennifer Miles presented to her lawyer1 30 as a female client seek-
ing legal representation in a sexual harassment case against her male
professor. Her lawyer didn't find out that she was transgender until




the discovery process, when the defendants requested psychiatric
records, which revealed that the plaintiff had been assigned male at
birth. Her story never changed, though. She was a woman who had
been sexually harassed by her male professor. Her lawyer initially
had some concern that the fact that she was assigned male at birth
might affect her status as a plaintiff, but upon further research deter-
mined that it didn't. Sexual harassment law states quite clearly that
the relevant inquiry is the defendant's perception of the plaintiff. In
the face of the defendant's attempts to dismiss the case based on this
revelation, Miles' lawyer was defiant: the fact that Miles was assigned
male at birth should not and did not change her legal claim. The har-
asser perceived her as female, and harassed her based on that percep-
tion. Case law was in her favor. End of story.
These stories portray individual people who didn't conform to the
"regime of truth" about gender and sexuality. These clients couldn't
be placed by their lawyers into one of the medical or scientific catego-
ries the law has adopted. They didn't talk about themselves as
"transsexual" or "transgender" or suffering from "gender identity dis-
order." And law students and lawyers struggled with that, often fall-
ing back on what they "knew" to be true about how boys looked, and
how women acted, and what case law said about what was relevant.
They looked to these official stories - common sense, the natural
order - in order to ground themselves as these clients' lawyers. But
those stories didn't offer much grounding in the face of the actual sto-
ries these clients were telling.
III. CONSTRUCTING THE NEW STORIES
To represent transgender clients whose personal stories do not
conform to the official stories of gender, lawyers must attend to their
clients' different reality. The lawyer's goal, though, is not to get to
some submerged, alternate reality, but rather to create the space for
the client to speak by examining whatever is inhibiting the lawyer
from hearing. The most important element in representation isn't
portraying the "other" with verisimilitude (what really happened,
what her story really is, finding out and telling the "truth"), but rather
recognizing what Spivak calls "the problem of representation," 131 and
engaging in critical reflection to undertake a collaborative process
with the client to construct a narrative that rings true to her experi-
ence and meets her goals. In this section, I will return to the stories of
MS and Sheila as clinic clients and examine what I call the two "stages
of self-location" in the act of representation. Analysis of how these
131 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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students and lawyers were able to engage in both stages and, there-
fore, effectively represent their transgender clients reveals lessons
overall about representation and official stories.
A. Locating Ourselves, Step One: "Creating The Space
For Her To Speak"'
132
In seeking to explain the argument she first elaborated in "Can
the Subaltern Speak?" Spivak proclaimed, "I don't think there is a
non-institutional environment,"'1 33 meaning there is no "truth" or "re-
ality" that exists outside the context of its particular "regime of truth."
Put another way, the "speech act" necessarily takes place "against a
backdrop of hidden, contestable assumptions without which we could
never function, but which necessarily predetermine in large measure
the results reached."'1 34 This backdrop of assumptions has also been
called "stereotypes," "background stories," "pre-understanding," and,
the most frequently but uncritically used term, "common sense.
135
We all pass stories through our own pre-existing screen of
"knowledge" about how people act. Because the stories of those
outside hegemonic discourse often conflict with that pre-existing
"knowledge," a tension arises between what the insiders "know"
about the outsiders and what the outsiders' stories are describing.
Confronted with this tension, insiders often choose not to question
their own version of reality-what they "know" is "true"-but rather
to recast the outsider's story into terms and language that make it
consistent with the insider's understanding of reality.136 The problem
of representation, then, as we have seen, is that our assumptions about
people and how they act, who they are, what they need, etc. prevent
132 Gunewardena, supra note 13, at 203-4 ("In order to enable her voice to be heard, our
task should be to create the space for her to speak.").
133 COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY, A READER 11 (Patrick Wil-
liams & Laura Chrisman eds., 1994); Spivak, supra note 18, at 12. Note that this quote
recalls Derrida's famous "il n'y a pas de hors-texte," or, roughly translated: there is noth-
ing outside of the text.
134 Jane E. Baron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255, 257 (1994).
135 See, e.g., Jane Aiken, Provocateurs for Justice, 7 CLIN. L. REV. 287, 299 (2001); Marc
A. Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding: A Defense of Outsider Narratives
in Legal Scholarship, 82 GEO. L.J. 1845 (1994) [hereinafter Fajer, Authority, Credibility,
and Pre-Understanding]; Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Story-
telling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992).
136 Fajer, Authority, Credibility, and Pre-Understanding, supra note 135, at 1856 ("Faced
with a conflict between deep-seated beliefs and a contradicting story, some people may
adjust their beliefs, but others are likely to reject the story as untrue."); see also Baron,
supra note 134, at 263 ("Background assumptions determine, in great measure, whether a
particular account will be heard as a... persuasive or believable story"); Gary Peller, The
Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313, 323 (1992).
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us from being able to hear the actual person standing before us.
Moreover, our attempts to "translate" a person's story into language
that we can hear further silence her because those attempts too take
place against this backdrop of pre-understanding and assumption.
The answer to this problem, though, is not to become paralyzed
or complacent, but rather to be constantly aware "of the location of
the individual and the circumstances of knowledge production.
'137
Or, put more simply, "it is necessary to learn how to attend. And you
make mistakes. Big deal."'1 38 Indeed, as Spivak notes with some opti-
mism, with this kind of "persistent critique of what one is up to ... I
think there is some hope."'1 39 It has long been understood that one of
the ways to challenge hegemony and the resulting oppression is "to
make visible and vocal the underlying assumptions that produce and
reproduce structures of domination.' 140 Specifically, much of critical
theory - feminist, race, queer - has focused on identifying and criti-
quing the process of defining and categorizing "the other," whatever
that "other" might be.
141
So in order to create space for the "other" to engage fully in and
thus complete the speech act, we need to be consciously and vigilantly
aware of what we bring to our representation of clients. We need to
engage in critical reflection in order to uncover the assumptions
through which we tend to pass all information that comes our way,
including how we define and categorize people seeking our legal assis-
tance.142 In this context, critical reflection means the process of ask-
ing questions: how will the judge apply the statute to my client's
situation, and why? How will the jury react to my client's appearance
on the stand? Why isn't my client calling me back? Why am I having
such a hard time connecting with my client? This could be called stra-
tegic planning or knowledge of precedent, or even familiarity with the
various personalities involved, but on deeper level, this kind of critical
reflection provides an opportunity to deconstruct what we know about
facts, about law, about client identity, and about how all those ele-
ments interact with one another.
Clinicians and other legal academics and scholars have long real-
137 COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND POST-COLONIAL THEORY, A READER, supra note 133.
138 Spivak, supra note 15, at 306-7.
139 Spivak, supra note 18, at 63.
140 TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 11 (citing Young
and Freire); see also id. at xvii ("Our goal in social justice education is to enable students to
become conscious of their operating world view and to be able to examine critically alter-
native ways of understanding the world and social relations.").
141 Harris, supra note 19, at 524.
142 See Aiken, supra note 135, at 298 ("Critical reflection has at its root an attempt to
tease out or hunt down assumptions.").
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ized that this kind of critical reflection is a powerful and necessary
tool to engage in the kind of intentional lawyering described in this
article.143 Through critical reflection, the lawyer self-consciously situ-
ates herself within the particular context in which she is operating.
Specifically, she situates herself in relation to the system and its rules.
She also situates herself in relation to the other characters involved
both in the system in general and in the particular interaction she is a
part of. Those other characters could be the other people - the
judge, the other lawyers, the witnesses, the government agency, the
opposing party, the client. But the other characters are also the rele-
vant rules, rituals, and practices of the particular system.
Through critical reflection, the lawyer is able to identify her abil-
ity to operate among these characters, as well as the limitations on
that ability, noticing what prevents her from moving freely among the
various pieces of the system. She is also able to identify the ability of
the other characters - particularly the people - to move freely
within the system, and the impediments on their ability to do so. By
noticing these things, the lawyer can further identify the available
choices about how to operate within the system in which she is situ-
ated. She can then identify the impact those choices have on her posi-
tion and on the position of the other characters in the system, and on
the system itself. In this way, therefore, critical reflection is the means
for the lawyer to identify the shifting nature of her position within the
particular context in which she is situated, the shifting nature of all the
other characters situated in that context, and the shifting nature of the
143 See id. at 296-300. Clinicians and other legal academics have written extensively on
the challenges of teaching "cross-cultural" and/or client-centered lawyering so that stu-
dents (who eventually become lawyers) are able to surmount this problem. See, e.g., Susan
Bryant & Jean Koh Peters, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Law-
yers, 8 CLIN. L. REV. 33 (2001); Bill Ong Hing, Raising personal Identification Issues of
Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability and Age in Law-
yering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for Social
Justice: Core Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 CLIN. L. REV. 195 (2002); Kimberly
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When lawyers work on cases that decenter them in ways that
force them to identify and overcome their own assumptions, they are
forced, too, to engage in this kind of critical reflection. 144 Cases in-
volving transgender clients provide a rich example of this kind of
decentering, and the resulting critical reflection that must take place.
Mirroring the case law described earlier, the two sets of students who
represented Sheila and MS found themselves confronted immediately
with the question of what to call and how to refer to their clients, as
well as how to describe and define them. With these questions, they
began the process of critical reflection that led them to be able to
attend to their clients.
In preparation for their first meeting with Sheila, the students
knew that the case involved cross petitions for temporary protection,
that both petitions had been granted, and that Sheila was seeking rep-
resentation for the subsequent civil protection order proceedings.
They learned from the intake materials filled out by the domestic vio-
lence clerk at the courthouse that Sheila was transgender and identi-
fied as a man. Sheila was in a relationship with a woman who had
filed a petition for a civil protection order, and against whom Sheila
sought a civil protection order.
Before meeting with the client, the students wondered how the
client's apparent lesbianism might end up playing a role in the case.
So they did research on domestic violence in gay and lesbian relation-
ships, including downloading fact sheets from the local police depart-
ment's gay and lesbian unit. They also read the relevant local rules on
filing civil protection orders, hoping to find guidance in there on how
to determine a petitioner's gender. They wondered if "you have to go
by biology, or are there other ways?" They did what all those appel-
late judges had done - looked for the answers in the "texts from the
other side." And like those appellate judges before them, they did not
find the answers in those texts.
As they confronted the basic question of what to call their client,
though, they parted ways with the appellate judges. They did not punt
either to the medical or scientific communities, or to their understand-
ing of the natural order of things. Instead, they talked about it with
their supervisor, who helped them realize that they couldn't figure it
out on their own, either in supervision or by doing research. 145 They
144 Aiken, supra note 135, at 293, describing her students' experience with a transgender
client.
145 It is beyond the scope of this article to explore fully the role of the supervisor in the
students' reflective process, but helping students move from their rigid understandings
about things like gender, race, class, is often one of the supervisor's greatest (and most
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needed their client. They decided that when they met with Sheila for
the first time, they would ask what pronoun to use. And that's what
they did, asking, "would like us to refer to you as 'he' or 'she' in the
court documents and in conversation?'
146
The students who represented MS initially felt confused by this
person who presented so clearly as what they thought of as a man -
albeit an effeminate one - but who got to a point where she wanted
to be called "Maria." One of them asked MS early on in the case, "I
mean, what are you?" Even when the client explained that she felt
like a woman, "not trapped, just a woman," the students persisted in
seeing the client as a man who identified as a woman.
Gradually, though, the lens through which the students were see-
ing MS started to shift. Because they knew it was what their client
wanted, they forced themselves to call her Maria and to use feminine
pronouns. At first it seemed strange to them, because the client still
looked very much like Mario. At one point, the client came in to the
clinic with her partner. For the first time, they saw their client in the
broader context of her life: in a relationship with someone who
thought of her as a girlfriend. This was an important part of what the
students described as the "cementing process" for them. They came to
be able to see their client the way she wanted them to - as a woman,
not an effeminate gay man or a woman trapped in a man's body, but a
woman - by paying attention to her and following her leads: by call-
ing her Maria, and by using feminine pronouns, and by seeing her
interact with her lover, not by seeing her dressed in woman's clothes.
And they both noticed that once they started to attend to her in this
way, the relationship deepened, and they became much closer to their
client. By the end of the case, they said, the three of them would just
sit around and "talk like three girls."
In grappling with these cases, these students came face to face
with their pre-understanding about gender: that it just "was." They
assumed that someone is either "him" or "her" and that such a deter-
mination is easy to make, something that "every schoolchild, even of
tender years"'147 can figure out. When pushed by their supervisors to
explore those assumptions more closely, to engage in critical reflec-
tion, they realized that these official stories did not help with their
representation of their particular clients.
And this is the exciting part: stripped of their assumptions about
how gender works, the students had the opportunity to attend to their
rewarding) challenges. See, e.g., Valdes, supra note 143.
146 As described earlier, Sheila told the students they could use female pronouns to
describe and refer to her. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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client, to this client, sitting before them. The students located them-
selves within the interaction between the client and them by noticing
the assumptions they had about gender and sexual identity and push-
ing them aside, uncomfortable as that may have been. In the space
left behind, the clients could tell their own stories. Thus, the students
were able to complete the first step of the process of representation:
they were able to see and hear their clients and to begin to understand
their stories, part and parcel as they were of the "chaos of lived,
gendered experience. '148
B. Locating Ourselves, Step Two: A Collaborative Enterprise
As we saw earlier, the second step of representation is the telling
of the client's story in a legal setting or framework. Like that frame-
work, though, these stories - whether those within the hegemonic
discourse, or those outside that discourse - are constructed. The
challenge for the representor once again is to locate herself in the pro-
cess of that construction, by being intentional and reflective about
what internal and external forces are shaping the story and by engag-
ing in collaboration with the client.
This means, as we've seen, that the lawyer must attend to the
client carefully and with an open mind to be able really to hear her
story. And it means that the lawyer must participate actively in the
relationship with the client. 149 The lawyer is an expert in the rules
that govern the particular legal system in which the representation is
taking place, and she must bring that expertise to the relationship and
add it to the mix of things that goes into constructing the new story.
Law students often struggle with this aspect of representation.
Jane Aiken, who has written about the stages of learning to be a criti-
cal thinker, notes that while the first step is for students "to see that
law is constructed rather than discovered," 150 the next, and often
much harder, step is for the student to recognize herself as a source of
knowledge and thus power, as a player within the legal system.151
This realization leads to the student's awareness that she is not merely
a mouthpiece for the client, nor a rigid narrator of official stories,
but "can play an active role in exposing the inherent biases in
148 Stone, supra note 44, at 11.
149 Spivak has remarked that "Finding the subaltern is not so hard, but actually entering
into a responsibility structure with the subaltern, with responses flowing both ways: learn-
ing to learn without this quick-fix frenzy of doing good with an implicit assumption of
cultural supremacy which is legitimized by unexamined romanticization, that's the hard
part." Spivak, supra note 15 at 293.
150 Aiken, supra note 135, at 290 ("The law does not exist 'out there' to be found; rather




law." 152 One of the ways to do that is to create space within the legal
context - in the telling of the client's legal story - for the client
herself to tell her story. Lawyers have to set up the conditions, how-
ever, that will allow that story to be heard.
We saw earlier how the law governing the issues raised by the
cases involving transgender clients is eclipsed by other official stories
- whether scientific or quasi-religious ("nature"). This absence of a
solid legal foundation provides creative and critical lawyers valuable
opportunities to step in and give the court an independent basis for
adjudicating the particular dispute before it, rather than punting to
one of the two official stories prior courts have relied on. That means
maneuvering among and through the gaps in the curtains we saw ear-
lier in the appellate cases, poking at, undermining, and sometimes out-
right challenging the assumptions on which the system of official
stories about gender is built.
Jennifer Miles described herself as a woman who had been sexu-
ally harassed by her male professor. Her lawyer determined that the
relevant case law provided support for an argument that the defen-
dant's perception of the plaintiff was the relevant inquiry and was able
to defeat the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on that
argument. It became clear in preparing for trial, though, that Miles'
main goal for this case was to tell the story of herself as a woman, not
just the story of the defendant's perception of her.
So the story told at trial - both by her appearance in the court
room as a woman, and by the testimony elicited from witnesses by her
lawyer - was that, despite her biological makeup, she had a "core
gender identity" as a woman. The jury was asked two questions: was
she sexually harassed, and did the defendant corporation have suffi-
cient notice to be held liable? The jury answered the first question
"yes" and the second question "no," meaning that Miles was unable to
recover any damages. She felt, however, that the jury had found that
she was a woman and thus that she had won her case. She had been
able to complete "the speech act" by telling her story and having it
heard and believed by the jury.
Sheila's case was complicated by the fact that she was both de-
fending against a petition for a civil protection order and seeking to
get one as well. Her story, therefore, was both that she did not hit her
wife, and that, in fact, her wife had hit her. The students came to
understand how Sheila's gender identity as a man played a role in
both aspects of this story. She felt pride and defiance in asserting her




wife. And she felt humiliated and vulnerable asking for the court's
intervention because a husband shouldn't need and doesn't ask for
protection from his wife. In putting together their legal case, the stu-
dents had to consider how, if at all, to incorporate these aspects of the
client's story.
We saw how the students began their representation of Sheila by
looking to "texts from the other side" - police department policies,
fact sheets on violence in gay and lesbian relationships, local rules and
statutes on filing petitions for civil protection orders - for answers to
their questions about the client's gender identity. Although those offi-
cial stories did not provide the answers they were looking for initially,
the students were able to bring what they had learned from those and
other sources back into the representation and use it in putting to-
gether the story they and their client ultimately told in court. Their
research on how courts handle cross petitions for civil protection and
petitions filed by women against men led them to conclude that the
case was going to hinge on credibility and that the plaintiff's gender
identity might play a role in whether the judge believed her story.
They were afraid that the judge might say, "If Sheila is the male, isn't
it more likely that she was the aggressor?" They were also afraid that
the cross-petitioner would play up her role as the "injured wife" and
appear very sympathetic to the judge, further undercutting Sheila's
defense and claim for protection.
Based on their understanding of the client's story, though, they
knew that the gender element - Sheila's identification as a man -
was significant to her. So they decided to "let it be there, but not
articulated." Because Sheila's vision of herself as "the man" in the
relationship was not necessary to achieve her legal goal of defending
against the petition and gaining the court's protection - and in fact
could have hurt both her defense and her claim - the students de-
cided not to argue the client's gender identity, nor to bring it out ex-
plicitly through their examination of witnesses. But Sheila came to
court dressed in a men's suit, presenting as a man, and the students
called her to the stand and elicited her story, knowing as they did so
that the only story Sheila would be comfortable telling was the story
she had told the students: that she was a loyal and devoted husband
who would never hit her wife; and that she felt pain and humiliation,
as the husband, at having to come seeking the court's protection
against her wife.
The students had been worried that Sheila's gender identity
would undercut her credibility and make it harder for her to prevail
on her claim. But they acknowledged afterwards that Sheila was
"great on the stand." She was "straightforward and incredibly sympa-
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thetic, and the way she told her story was very compelling." The
judge granted her petition for a civil protection order and dismissed
the claim against her.
The students who represented MS had come to understand that
despite how she initially presented, MS' story was that she was a
woman, not a gay man who identified as a woman, or a man trapped
in a woman's body, but a woman. They also had come to understand
that she felt that she lived in two worlds, public and private, and could
and did adjust her gender presentation to accommodate those two
worlds. She could and did present as a man in the public sphere and
as a woman in the private sphere.
The challenge for the students, then, was to figure out how to tell
this story in such a way as to gain asylum for their client. They knew
from their work on other asylum cases, and on their extensive re-
search in "texts from the other side" that courts distinguished between
transvestites and those they perceived as having "gender identity con-
flicts," and tended to grant asylum to the latter more readily than to
the former. They also knew that courts had granted asylum if the
plaintiff had suffered past persecution for his homosexuality.
They were concerned that MS' story about her two worlds would
undercut her claim for asylum because the asylum officer might see
her as more analogous to a transvestite than to someone with a "gen-
der identify conflict." "If you can hide your 'female identity' here be-
cause you're afraid of persecution," the officer might ask, "why can't
you hide it in El Salvador?" So the students decided to use the term
"transgender" as an umbrella term to cover both a "transsexual" and
a gay man with female sexual identity. Their theory was that MS was
seeking asylum due to past persecution on the basis of being trans-
gender as a gay man with a female identity.
The students also came to realize that the decision whether or not
to grant asylum to any individual client depended much more on the
particular asylum officer's perceptions during the asylum interview
than on the governing legal texts. They realized that in order to win
MS' case, in the course of that interview, they would have to make the
asylum officer "realize what it took us months to realize": that MS was
telling the truth, even though her story didn't fit in to the "regime of
truth" that governed this particular legal arena, and that it was okay to
grant asylum based on her story.
In preparing for the interview, the students once again con-
fronted the pronoun and name issues. They acknowledged that, by
that point in their relationship with their client, it felt awkward and
wrong to call her Mario or Mr. Santiago, or to refer to her using male
pronouns. But they decided as part of their strategy to tell a story
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about transgender identity, that they would present their client to the
asylum officer as Mario Santiago, but thereafter call and refer to her
as "Maria." They also decided they would use male pronouns in the
petition and all supporting documents, but use female pronouns dur-
ing the interview.
They also knew that they had to anticipate negative stereotypes
the asylum officer might hold, and they had to avoid playing into
those assumptions. A big issue was how the client would appear for
the asylum interview. They went back and forth with the client about
this. Initially they thought she should dress as a woman. She seemed
reluctant to do so since the interview would take place in a context she
thought of as the public sphere, but she also seemed excited at the
opportunity to show off how beautiful she was as a woman. However,
once the students saw her dressed as a woman - at the community
center Christmas party - they determined that it would be "too dis-
tracting" for the asylum officer and would play into his stereotypes of
drag queens and flamboyant gay men. So they suggested to the client
that she wear what she had worn to the initial interview with them -
tight pants and a brown flowered shirt - and explained that it was
consistent with their legal story to have her dress as an effeminate
man.
Maria appeared at the interview as a man, but she was "a little
feminine." She had on mascara and wore high, feminine boots, and
tight pants. The overall impression she gave was of a "very vulnerable
person with gender identity conflicts." The students remarked on the
risk Maria had taken in exposing her femininity to the asylum officer
because she is normally protective of that identity when she is in the
public sphere. They believed she had made a strategic choice based
on their counseling her about their legal theory that ended up being
very effective. Maria was granted asylum.
In representing their transgender clients, the lawyers and law stu-
dents described in this piece did both things required of effective rep-
resentation: they were able to attend to the clients and elicit their
particular stories, and they were able to locate themselves as experts
in the particular legal arenas in which their clients' stories unfolded
and create an atmosphere within that arena in which the clients'
voices could be heard. They collaborated with their clients to con-
struct stories that felt consistent with the clients' own lived realities
and that served the clients' needs within the legal system.
CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED
Several months after my initial contacts with the students who
represented these clients, I followed up with questions about what
Spring 2006]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
they learned from working on the cases. What I heard back were two
basic points. First, the students learned that in order to gain client
trust, lawyers have to be able to really see the client: "Even though
Maria looks like a man to us, we have accepted her as a woman, refer
to her by her female name, and have learned to make that transition
that is so effective in building a strong relationship with the client.
That step was essential for her to be 'herself' around us - to bring us
into that small, private circle of people who accept her as a woman."
The second point that the students came to understand was that
stories are complicated and require time and energy to construct:
"We... learned that it can take a while to get a story out - that it can
take many, many sessions. Sometimes, we just asked the wrong ques-
tions and didn't think to follow up .... With our next client, we were
able to learn to let the story come out over several visits and to keep
listening and following up to get out the entire story."
At least in these cases, then, the decentering worked: these stu-
dents - and I, over their shoulders - learned about confronting and
challenging assumptions through critical reflection. What looks like a
man isn't necessarily a man; what seem like the right questions aren't
always the right questions; what appears to be the whole story ends up
being only a small portion; what seems to be a solid legal foundation
actually has cracks and crevices.
But what does that teach us about critical reflection in represen-
tation in general? We must attend carefully to what the client is asking
of us. Accept what she tells us as her truth, even if it doesn't make
sense with what we know as our truth. Notice what is getting in our
way. Representation that facilitates the client's completion of the
speech act depends on critical reflection that allows the lawyer to
make space for the multiplicity of clients' stories.
And this isn't just with transgender clients: by being open to hear-
ing and seeing the "chaos of lived gendered experience," we learn to
be open to hearing and seeing the chaos of lived experience in gen-
eral. Representation of transgender clients forces an awareness that
we all operate with certain assumptions and understandings of world,
and that those assumptions might get in our way as we try to be per-
suasive advocates for our clients. We can use the experience of these
students - and the representation of transgender clients in general -
as a metaphor: if we notice what we bring to the representation -
both our assumptions and our expertise - we are able to hear our
client's particular story and work with her to construct a new story
that both rings true for her and can be heard and believed by the legal
decisionmaker. In this way, critical reflection is a skill that makes us
better lawyers for all our clients.
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